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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
held that cross-examination as to the unchastity of a witness exists as a matter of
right in the Coella case, but later in State v. Linton, 36 Wn. 2d 67, 216 P. 2d 761
(1950), a decision that impliedly overruled the Coella case, held that there is no right
to cross-examine or to admit extrinsic evidence of specific instances of unchastity, but
that the trial court has discretion whether or not to admit the evidence. In view of the
declaration in the principal case that there is no room for judicial discretion in allow-
ing evidence of unchastity to affect credibility, it would seem logically necessary for
the court in the future to hold that specific instances of unchastity are also inadmissible
for the purpose of affecting credibility.
GEORGE K. FLER
Rules on Appeal-Time for Filing Statement of Facts Where Motion for New Trial
Pending After Entry of Judgment. In a civil action tried to the court, judgment was
entered immediately after the findings of fact were filed, and D moved for a new trial.
Before the motion was ruled upon, he perfected an appeal. The motion was later denied,
after which D gave a second notice of appeal. His statement of facts was served 125
days after the entry of judgment and forty-six days after the denial of the motion.
P moved to strike the statement of facts, contending that the time for filing and serving
the statement had expired ninety days after the date of entry of judgment. Held:
Motion denied. A statement of facts must be served and filed within ninety days after
the date of entry of judgment, or, if a motion for a new trial has been timely filed,
within ninety days from the date of entry of the order denying the motion for a new
trial. Dunseath v. Hallauer, 40 Wn. 2d 708, 246 P. 2d 496 (1952).
By this holding, the Supreme Court has, in effect, changed the wording of Rule on
Appeal 34, 34A Wn. 2d 36, which requires a statement of facts to be served and filed
within ninety days after the date of entry of final judgment or appealable order. The
ruling was necessary to dispel an apparent inconsistency among the rules and statutes
relating to procedure on appeal.
RCW 4.64.010 [RRS § 431] provides that judgment may be entered by the court
"at any time after two days from the return" of the verdict. (Where a case is tried to
the court, the signing of the findings of fact is comparable to the return of the verdict
in a jury trial.) During the two-day period before the entry of judgment, a motion for
a new trial may be served and filed. See RCW 4.76.060 [RRS § 402]. In spite of the
statute, courts continue to enter judgments simultaneously with the return of the
verdict or the signing of the findings of fact. Where the statute is followed, a motion
for a new trial is not entertained after judgment is entered, and the question before the
court in the Dunseath case does not arise. The motion is determined before entry of
judgment, and the time for taking an appeal and for filing the statement of facts begins
to run from the date of the judgment. It has not been suggested that the failure of the
trial court to observe the statuory procedure should deprive a party of his privilege
of moving for a new trial.
Although Rule 34 provides that the statement of facts must be filed within ninety
days after the entry of judgment or appealable order, Rule 33(5) allows an appeal to
be taken upon the denial of a motion for a new trial when the motion is made after
entry of judgment. An order denying a motion for a new trial is not appealable.
Wilson v. Katzer, 37 Wn. 2d 944, 226 P. 2d 910 (1951). See RCW 4.88.010 [RRS §
1716] and Rule on Appeal 14, 34A Wn. 2d 20. The appeal taken after denial of the
motion for a new trial is nevertheless an appeal from the judgment; and under a literal
reading of Rule 34, the time for filing the statement of facts begins to run from the
date of the judgment, not from the date of the order. Thus a strict application of Rule
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34 would require that the statement of facts be filed within ninety days after the enti-y
of judgment even though a motion for a new trial was pending and was not determined
until after the expiration of the ninety days. Should the motion be denied, unless the
appellant has filed his statement of facts before the ruling, he would find himself with
a right of appeal, given under Rule 33(5), but 'with no right to present his statement
of facts. Consequently, he would have little hope of a favorable decision, since in the
absence of a statement of facts, the Supreme Court refuses to rule on assignments of
errors whichdo not appear on the face of the record. Lilly Co. v. Parrino, 18 Wn. 2d
128, 138 P. 2d 206 (1943) ; Wheatley v. Washington Jockey Club, 39 Wn. 2d 163, 234
P. 2d 878 (1951). On the other hand, if, fearing such an eventuality, he had proceeded
to file his statement and later the motion for a new trial was granted, he would have
been put to useless trouble and expense.
In view of these possibilities, the holding of the instant case, insofar as it dates the
time for taking an appeal and the time for filing the statement of facts from the same
event, seems only reasonable. Its apparent conflict with the wording of Rule 34 is miti-
gated if the reasoning of the court in Reeves v. Wilson, 105. Wash. 318, 177 Pac. 825
(1919) is applied: "The motion for a new trial suspends the effect of the judgment until
after the determination of the motion and filing of the order denying the motion." In
other words, the judgment does not become final until the motion is determined.
While consistent with dicta in cases decided under the rule in effect from 1938
until the present rules were adopted in 1951, the decision in the Dunseath case embodies
the first direct holding reconciling the present rules. Since the time for filing had
expired, statements in the earlier cases to the effect that the time should be computed
from the denial of the motion for a new trial were not decisive of any issue presented
therein. See Lilly Co. v. Parrino, supra; State ex rel Grange Store v. Riddell, 27 Wn.
2d 134, 177 P. 2d 78 (1947) ; Wheeler v. Birch & Sons Const. Co., supra.
The language of the present holding may raise a question as to the status of a
party whose motion for a new trial has been .denied, but against whom judgment has
not been entered. However, since an order denying a motion for a new trial is not
appealable, it is unlikely that the court would interpret its ruling in the Dunseath case
to mean that the appellant must file his statement of facts within ninety days after the
denial of such a motion when there exists no judgment or order from which he can
take an appeal.
In view of the holding, is an appeal premature if it is taken after entry of final
judgment but before the denial of the motion for a new trial? Conceivably a respond-
ent could be harmed if he had expended the effort necessary to prepare his brief, and
the new trial was subsequently granted. However, if the appellant is allowed to wait
until after the determination of his motion before taking his appeal, the probability of
such an occurrence is not as great as it would be if he were required to carry it through
from the date of entry of judgment. The question is not discussed in the main case;
rather D's earlier appeal is "treated as abandoned." Presumably an appeal taken before
denial of a motion for a new trial is not untimely.
JOANNE BALEY
Income Tax-Deductibility of Legal Expenses. P made a gift of 1,000 shares of stock
to members of his family and paid the federal gift tax thereon. Thereafter P was noti-
fied by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of a gift tax deficiency of $145,276.50.
Through his attorney, P secured a settlement of the deficiency for $15,612.75. He did
not deduct the legal expenses of the gift tax controversy from his gross income but
later claimed an income tax refund on the ground that the legal fee should have been
deducted under INT. Rxv. CODE § 23 (a) (2). The District Court held for P. The Court
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